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RECENT CASES
WORVMzN'S

COVPENSATION-SrBSEQUENT

INJURY-DUPLICATING

AwARDs.

Plaintiff filed a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act for permanent partial disability due to an injury to his right middle finger. The
supervisor rejected the claim upon the ground that the workman had
previously been adjudged totally and permanently disabled by reason
of a former back injury and had been awarded a lump sum payment, in
lieu of a monthly pension for life. Appeal from a joint board rehearing
allowing the claim. Held: Claim dismissed, Harrington v. Dept. of Labor
and Industries, 109 Wash. Dec. 78, 113 P. (2d) 518 (1941), 9 U. oF CI. L.
REv. 184, the court saying: "A subsequent lesser disability cannot be superimposed upon the maximum disability recognized by law." The basis for
the decision was ERnm. REv. STAT. § 7679 (g), which provides in part:
"Should a further accident occur to a workman who has been previously
the recipient of a lump sum payment under this act, his future compensation shall be adjudged according to other provisions of this section and
with regard to the combined effect of his injuries and his past receipt
of money under this act."
Does a workman who has received a lump sum for total disability and
who subsequently recovers his health undertake further employment at
his own risk? Or, since he no longer comes under the Act, may the workman have a common law action for damages against his employer? If
the latter is true, the employer has paid his insurance premiums for
naught, as he is without protection.
The court cites two cases to support its holding: Van Tassel v. Basic
Refractories Corp., 216 App. Div. 774, 214 N. Y. S. 491 (1926) and Ingram
v. W. J. Rainey, Inc., 127 Pa. Super. 481, 193 Atl. 335 (1937). In these cases
the workman was already receiving the maximum monthly provision
allotted under the statute, so an additional monthly payment would give
him more than the maximum allowance stated in the act. However, if the
workman in the Harrington case were to receive compensation for his
finger, the amount would not exceed the $15 per month maximum laid
down by the act.
It should be noted, also, that in both of these cases the claimant had
the same employer when he received his injuries, whereas, in the Harrington case, the injuries were received under different employers.
The court cites one other case, Asplund Construction Co. v. State Ind.
Comm., 185 Okla. 171, 90 P. (2d) 642 (1939), which held contra on similar
facts. The court laid the inconsistency to the wording of the respective
state statutes. REM. REV. STAT § 7679 (g), quoted above, was previously
interpreted by the court in Klippert v. Ind. Ins. Dep't, 114 Wash. 525, 196
Pac. 17 (1921). There, claimant was seeking to recover the stipulated
award for loss of an arm, when he had already recovered an award for
loss of an eye. The court, holding claimant was entitled to the full amount,
said the quoted clause referred to: "injuries to the same member which
had been previously compensated within the maximum, and to which a
subsequent injury was sustained and still leave the injured workman
only permanently partially disabled."
The decision in the instant case expands the application of this clause
to include injuries to any member of the body. Will this new view be
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limited to cases where the first lump payment was for total permanent
disability or will it overrule the Klippert case and include cases where the

first payment was for partial disability?
The court pointed out that a duplication of awards would be the result
if an opposite decision had been reached. Yet does not the Act itself
recognize the validity of such possible duplication? The last clause of
§ 7679 (g) states: "Should any further accident result in the. permanent
total disability of such injured workman, he shall receive the pension to
which he would be entitled notwithstanding the payment of a lump sum
for his prior injury." Thus, although the Act specifically allows a workman to receive an award for partial disability and subsequently an award
for total disability, if the workman receives an award for total disability
first, he is precluded from further compensation for subsequent injuries.
The doctrine of the Klippert case also allows duplication. By the loss of
both legs at different times, a workman could collect $4,560, yet § 7681 provides that a lump sum payment in case of total disability shall not exceed
$4,000. Accord, Constantin Refinzng Co. v. Crockett, 87 Okla. 24, 208 Pac.
788 (1922)
The fact that the workman has been erroneously adjudged permanently
disabled, should not bar him from the protection of the Act, if he later
recovers and seeks employment. In view of the fact that the Act does
not prohibit further compensatibn after a workman has been adjudged
permanently partially disabled, but on the contrary, recognizes a possible
duplication of awards, and in view of the policy of the Act to protect
both worker and employer, it would seem that a better approach to the
problem would be to judge additional awards according to loss of earning
power resulting from the injury rather than to apply the technical rule
that the "whole includes the less."
H. E. K.
MANSLAUGHTER-NEGLIGENCE-STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTIoN.

Defendant went

hunting with his friends, A and B. They separated according to a plan
which was to make their hunt more effective. While still daylight, about
five o'clock in the afternoon, the defendant saw "the head and shoulders
of a deer" among the brush. He fired, and the bullet struck A in the head,
killing him. Defendant was charged with manslaughter, allegedly having
acted "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
without using ordinary
caution in that he knew or should have known other human beings were
in Ins close vicinity, and without keeping a proper lookout for other human
beings.
" The jury brought in a verdict of guilty as charged, whereupon the defendant made motion in arrest of judgment and for a new
trial. The motion in arrest of judgment was granted, but no action was
taken on the motion for a new trial. The State appealed. The order was
reversed and cause remanded with instructions to the trial court to vacate
that order and rule on the defendant's motion for a new trial. State v.
Hedges, 8 Wn. (2d) 652, 113 P (2d) 530 (1941)
In the opinion of this case, the Court takes occasion to make a definitive
statement of the measure of negligence necessary to convict, under our
manslaughter statute, for a honumde resulting from the commission of a
lawful act. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court starts with REm. REv.
STAT. § 2395, defining manslaughter thus: "In any case other than those
specified in §§ 2392, 2393, and 2394, homicide, not being excusable or
justifiable, is manslaughter." REm. REv. STAT. §§ 2392, 2393, and 2394, re-
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spectively, define murder in the first and second degrees, and a killing in
the course of fighting a duel. Admittedly, this cannot be justifiable homicide, so the court considers Rem. § 2404, defining excusable homicide which
is " . . . committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by
lawful means, with ordinary caution and without unlawful intent (italics
supplied). All four of these elements must be present, says the Court, in
order for the homicide to come within this section.
The defendant argued that the phrase "with ordinary caution" should
be construed to mean with slight caution, that failure to use ordinary
caution is ordinary negligence, while failure to use slight caution would
constitute "gross negligence," or that degree of negligence which must
be proved before the death amounts to manslaughter. But the Court said,
" . . . giving the words their ordinary meaning, the exercise of ordinary
caution and the presence of the other elements of the statute, with the
absence of the unlawul intent equal excusable homicide; while the absence
of ordinary caution, or affirmatively speaking, the presence of ordinary
negligence plus death, equal manslaughter."
Various cases in this jurizdiction in which language apparently to the
oontrary is found, cited by the Court in its opinion, State v. Hopkins, 147
Wash. 198, 265 Pac. 481, 59 A. L. R. 688 (1928); State v. Sandvig, 141 Wash.
542, 251 Pac. 887 (1927); State v. Hoyer, 105 Wash. 160, 177 Pac. 683 (1919);
State v. Palmer, 104 Wash. 396, 176 Pac. 547 (1918), were either distinguishable on their facts from the instant case, or did not consider the specific
question, hence the language in those opinions did not govern the instant
case. In State v. Turpin, 158 Wash. 103, 290 Pac. 824 (1930), the Court
intimated that grossly negligent conduct is necessary to convict under
REm. REV. STAT. § 2404. But the Court in the instant case said that since
the issue in the Turpin case was whether the homicide was justifiable,
the language with regard to the degree of negligence did not amount to
a holding.
The Court was influenced by the decision of the Wisconsin court in
Clements v. State, 176 Wis. 289, 185 N. W. 209, 21 A. L. R. 1490 (1921),
where under a statute similar to REm. REV. STAT. § 2404 the holding was
that " . . . the elements of usual and ordinary caution in the performance
of an act are essential constituents involved in the definition of the
ordinary care, and under such definition the failure to perform such
lawful act with usual and ordinary care as the mass of mankind exercises
under the same or similar circumstances constitutes negligence." The
Wisconsin court suggested, however, that the legislature might well amend
the statute to require a finding of gross negligence before an accused
could be convicted, and the Wisconsin legislature did so amend in accordance with the suggestion. State v. Whatley, 210 Wis. 157, 245 N. W.
93, 99 A. L. R. 749 (1932).
The Washington Court makes the same suggestion: that if it be desirable
to require a finding of gross negligence to convict, a statutory change
must be made; that under the statute as it stands no other measure of
negligence can be made to apply. As our Court says, statutes like that
of this State are rare in other jurisdictions. Most of them require a finding
of gross negligence. People v. Searle, 33 Cal. App. 228, 164 Pac. 819 (1917);
State v. Cope, 204 N. C. 28, 167 S. E. 456 (1933); Copeland v. State, 154
Tenn. 7, 285 S. W. 565, 49 A. L. R. 605 (1926); State v. Gutheil, 98 Utah
205, 98 P. (2d) 943 (1940). In most of these jurisdictions manslaughter is
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in two degrees-voluntary and involuntary-and the test of the involuntary manslaughter is that the negligence resulting in death must be gross
negligence or conduct "which imports a thoughtless -disregard of consequences or heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others." Copeland v State, supra. This is essentially the definition of negligence under
the common law concept of involuntary manslaughter, and this seems to
be the majority view.
But in our jurisdiction there are no degree of manslaughter; we have
abandoned the common law view. Any killing which is not murder in
either the first or second degrees, or justifiable or excusable, is manslaughter. And our statutes do seem to mean that ordinary negligence
in the performance of a lawful act which results in death will constitute
manslaughter. If there are any changes to be made in this interpretation
of the law in our State, such change must come from the legislature.
J. B. K.

